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The obligation to consider the best interests of the child in all cases concerning children has 
a central status in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989. This 
article provides a systematic comparison of how the best interests concept is understood and 
used in child protection and immigration jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights. The article compares all child protection and immigration judgments where the court 
has referred to the best interests of the child until the end of 2017. It shows that the court 
assesses the best interests of the child differently in the two case groups. First, in child 
protection cases, the court assumes that it is in the child’s best interests to live with her 
parents, whereas in immigration cases, family unity is not the starting point of the court. 
Secondly, in immigration cases, the child’s young age is understood as adaptability, whereas 
in child protection cases, young age is associated with care needs. Thirdly, the court has 
considered children’s views in several child protection cases but rarely in immigration cases. 
This article argues that, from the perspective of children’s rights, the court’s approach in 
immigration cases is problematic. 
 
Introduction 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (CRC) requires in its 
Article 3(1) that ‘in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private 
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the 
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration’. The Committee on the Rights of 
the Child, the monitoring body of the CRC, has elevated Article 3 as one of the ‘general 
principles’ of the Convention and stated that best interests have to be understood in a rights-
based way,1 ensuring the full and effective enjoyment of all the rights recognised in the CRC 
and the holistic development of a child. In addition, best interests have to be ‘a primary 
consideration’ in all cases concerning children, which means that they have special 
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importance and are not only applicable in matters with an obvious connection to children’s 
rights but also in areas where the children’s rights perspective has traditionally not been 
prominent.2 The concept of best interests has been criticised for being indeterminate and 
paternalistic, among other reasons.3 To understand the validity of such criticism, further 
scrutiny of how the concept behaves in concrete situations where rights conflict is required.  
This article compares how the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the court) 
understands and uses the concept of the best interests of the child in child protection versus 
immigration jurisprudence. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR has been described as a measure 
of the practical significance that is attached to children’s rights in the sphere of the protection 
of international human rights.4 The best interests concept is not included in the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (the 
European Convention), but it is relatively well established in the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR.5 Overall, the European Convention is subject to the general rules of treaty 
interpretation, including that any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties shall be taken into account.6 All the contracting parties to the European 
Convention have ratified the CRC, which strengthens the CRC’s role in the interpretation of 
the European Convention. Indeed, the ECtHR has acknowledged the CRC’s importance on 
several occasions.7 The ECtHR has noted that authorities must consider best interests in their 
proportionality assessments and that this balance must be safeguarded by taking into account 
international conventions, notably the CRC.8 The need to apply the concept in various 
contexts has also been recognised.9 However, the court’s argumentation regarding best 
interests has been criticised for inconsistency and for relying on the concept as a rhetorical 
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device that has no real effect on the reasoning.10 
This article is based on all judgments concerning child protection and immigration until the 
end of 2017 in which the ECtHR has referred to the best interests of the child.11 The cases 
were obtained from HUDOC using the index words ‘best interests’, ‘best interest’, ‘intérêt 
supérieur’, and ‘intérêts supérieurs’ amongst Chamber and Grand Chamber judgments.12 As 
the objective was to analyse the ECtHR’s understanding of best interests, argumentation by 
parties or national courts was not systematically analysed. It is important to remember, 
however, that the court’s judgments are not created in a vacuum but are shaped by the 
arguments of the parties.13 Furthermore, a reference to ‘best interests’ does not fully convey 
how the court understands the best interests of the child and what weight it accords to 
children’s rights in different situations, nor does it guarantee an outcome that complies with 
the rights of the child. Use of the term is ‘no substitute for proper argument’.14 Conversely, 
an outcome that respects the rights of the child can be reached without mentioning best 
interests. However, analysing references to the term reveals the kind of connotations that the 
court attaches to it. 
Child protection and immigration cases differ in several important respects. In child 
protection cases, as in most scenarios concerning interference in family life, the child’s rights 
and interests are the reason for interference, and the competing rights are those of the child 
and those of parents. In immigration cases, the right to respect for family life of the child and 
parents is contrasted with state sovereignty with respect to border control. Public interest is 
conceptualised as the state’s interest in controlling immigration. The margin of appreciation 
is usually wide in both case groups, although the breadth varies depending on the issue, but it 
concerns different factors.15 Child protection cases are also characterised by a need to 
respond to the child’s situation quickly, which is not a prominent feature in immigration 
cases.  
Consequently, this article does not claim that the assessment of best interests in child 
protection and immigration cases should be identical. Nevertheless, questions about whether 
an interference in family life is justified and whether a child can be separated from her 
parents are relevant to both case groups. Therefore, the comparison explores whether the 
same rights are approached differently depending on the case group and whether the weight 
of best interests varies. While the current human rights system allows differential treatment 
based on immigration status,16 it is important to highlight the implications of this 
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differentiation and to raise the question whether positioning human rights limits differently to 
such an extent is acceptable in light of the underlying principles of human rights. It has been 
argued that the oft-repeated idea that a state has, according to well-established international 
law, the right to control the entry of non-nationals into its territory, is not necessarily that 
well-founded or well-established.17 Marie-Bénédicte Dembour has shown that the ‘Strasbourg 
reversal’ – the way that Strasbourg migrant case law frequently privileges state sovereignty 
over migrants’ rights – is problematic from a human rights perspective.18 
Comparing different case groups is especially important where children are concerned. In the 
CRC, the obligation to consider best interests extends to all decisions concerning children. 
Children are children regardless of their immigration status (or the immigration status or 
conduct of their parents), and possible discrepancies in the level of protection in different 
contexts merit scrutiny. Improving argumentation related to best interests is an essential step 
towards more child-friendly jurisprudence.  
Previous research has shown that the court treats immigration matters as a distinct context in 
which people can legitimately be treated less favourably. According to Geraldine Van 
Bueren, the protection that the ECtHR offers children and family life is arguably at its 
weakest in immigration cases.19 In 1999, Ursula Kilkelly observed that, with some 
exceptions, ECtHR jurisprudence in immigration cases lacks the child focus evident in all 
other Article 8 areas.20 An important question of this article is whether the court has changed 
its approach.  
The following sections analyse the most important elements that the court connects to the 
best interests of the child in child protection and immigration cases. Physical integrity in 
child protection cases and ties with the host country or country of origin in immigration cases 
are discussed first. The article then compares the case groups. The most remarkable 
differences relate to how the court assesses family unity, the child’s age, and the child’s 
views.21 
Characteristics of child protection and immigration cases before the 
ECtHR 
At the outset, the research for this article was not limited to a certain right or provision of the 
European Convention. However, all of the cases examined concern the right to respect for 
private and family life (Article 8), which is why a violation refers in this article to a violation 
                                                 
Dembour, When Humans Become Migrants. Study of the European Court of Human Rights with an Inter-
American Counterpoint (OUP, 2015), 35–61.  
17 In ECtHR case law, the principle first appeared in the first Strasbourg migrant case Abdulaziz, Cabales and 
Balkandali v United Kingdom (Application Nos 9214/80, 9473/81, 9474/81) (1985) 7 EHRR 471, [67]; 
B Schotel, On the Right of Exclusion: Law, Ethics and Immigration Policy (Routledge, 2012); Dembour, above 
n 16, 4–5, 117, 127–129. 
18 Dembour, above n 16, 117–118; see also T Spijkerboer, ‘Structural Instability: Strasbourg Case Law on 
Children’s Family Reunion’ (2009) 11 EJML 271, 292. 
19 G Van Bueren, Child rights in Europe. Convergence and divergence in judicial protection (Council of Europe 
Publishing, 2007), 123. 
20 U Kilkelly, The Child and the European Convention on Human Rights (Ashgate, 1999), 219–221. 
21 Similarly, see C Smyth, ‘The Best Interests of the Child in the Expulsion and First-entry Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights: How Principled is the Court’s use of the Principle?’ (2015) 17 EJML 70, 75. 
Also, M Leloup, ‘Some Reflections on the Principle of the Best Interests of the Child in European Expulsion 
Case Law’, in W Benedek et al (eds), European Yearbook on Human Rights (Intersentia, 2018), 401. 
of Article 8. The prerequisite for an application to be considered under Article 8 is the 
existence of private or family life. Article 8 can be limited by certain criteria: limitations must 
be in accordance with the law, serve a legitimate aim, and be necessary in a democratic 
society. The respondent state rarely contests that taking a child into care or expelling a parent 
constitutes an interference.22 Similarly, the criterion of being in accordance with the law is 
usually satisfied easily. Protecting the best interests of the child – the reason for interference 
in child protection cases – is a legitimate aim since the list of acceptable aims in Article 8 
contains the ‘rights and freedoms of others’. In immigration cases, aims such as the economic 
well-being of the state or national security are also considered legitimate. Whether a 
limitation is necessary in a democratic society requires more scrutiny, and best interests are 
usually discussed at this stage of argumentation. 
The earliest child protection case with a reference to best interests was decided in 1996,23 
whereas the earliest immigration case dates to 2006.24 Despite being the first child protection 
judgment where best interests are explicitly referred to, Johansen relies on earlier case law to 
justify why best interests are an acceptable basis for intervening in family life. Indeed, the 
language of best interests has not necessarily led to a major change in the child-specific 
factors that the court assesses; according to established case law, ‘[t]he mutual enjoyment by 
parent and child of each other’s company constitutes a fundamental element of family life’.25  
In both case groups, the ECtHR has emphasised the importance of best interests and referred 
to the ‘broad consensus, including in international law, that in cases concerning children their 
best interests have to be paramount’.26 Interestingly, formulations used by the ECtHR are 
often stronger than in Article 3(1) CRC, which provides that best interests must be ‘a’ – not 
‘the’ – primary consideration. The ECtHR has described children’s interests as ‘overriding’,27 
‘paramount’,28 ‘superior’,29 and ‘determining’,30 but it has also used less obliging 
formulations, such as ‘the Court will attach particular importance to the best interests of the 
child which, depending on their nature and seriousness, may override those of the parent’.31 
Often, however, there is a mismatch between the obliging vocabulary and the weight 
accorded to best interests. The court often emphasises best interests but does not always 
identify factors to be considered in applying the concept or what weight should be attached to 
each factor to ensure compatibility with Article 8.32 
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Child protection 
In the majority of child protection cases in which the ECtHR has referred to best interests, the 
child has been taken into public care. Challenges usually concern the alleged unjustified 
nature of a care order or further restrictions, which perhaps reflects the fact that the state’s 
main duty in the context of child protection is a negative one, although some allege omissions 
by national authorities.33 The application may concern different aspects of the care 
proceedings, which are separately assessed. The first aspect is the legitimacy of taking the 
child into care. The second is the procedure: in child protection cases, the court considers that 
Article 8 has a procedural limb, requiring that decision-making procedures be fair and all 
parties be given a possibility to be heard or otherwise sufficiently involved. The third aspect 
concerns the period that the child has been in care, often with contact restrictions. The fourth 
concerns the refusal to end public care.34 
The ECtHR has acknowledged that identifying the child’s best interests requires courts to 
weigh numerous factors, but an exhaustive list has not been created because the factors vary 
so much.35 Many child protection cases reflect a connection between best interests and 
physical integrity. If a conflict arises between maintaining family ties and ensuring 
development in a safe and secure environment, the latter tends to prevail.36 In verdicts of 
violation, dissenters have often criticised the majority for not giving sufficient weight to the 
child’s interests.37 An important principle repeated in several cases is that a parent is not 
entitled to take measures that would harm the child’s health and development.38 
The court has been reluctant to find a violation because of the act of taking the child into 
public care when abuse or suspicions of abuse have occurred, invoking the ‘obviously 
paramount interest’ of protecting the child from a parent suspected of physical abuse.39 
Conversely, the fact that allegations of mistreatment have not been presented during the 
procedure has led the court to conclude that the act of taking into care has violated 
Article 8.40 Expert evidence plays an important role in demonstrating abuse and in indicating 
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whether meeting the parents is harmful.41 
In unclear situations, it is better to be careful. The court, for instance, regarded a care order as 
justified in a situation where it was issued after one of the applicant parents’ children had 
been injured. Since the applicants had not proven that the injury was caused by an accident, 
national authorities could reasonably have considered that placing the children in public care 
for some time was in the children’s best interests.42 The same approach applies to contact 
restrictions and ending public care, although the margin of appreciation is narrower 
concerning decisions that restrict relationships further.43 In Jovanovic, the applicant’s son 
suffered from brain bleeding with lifelong consequences. The ECtHR found that, since it was 
unclear who had caused the injuries, the authorities had good grounds for keeping the child in 
public care. The parents had, at the least, failed to protect the child.44 Similarly, sexual abuse 
or allegations of sexual abuse, even if not confirmed by a judicial finding, diminish the 
probability of the court finding a care order to constitute a violation. In such situations, the 
court has held that the placement or contact restrictions are in the child’s best interests.45 
Immigration 
In immigration cases, best interests do not have an elevated status. The ECtHR usually 
emphasises that Article 8 does not establish a general obligation to respect immigrants’ 
choice of residence or allow family reunification.46 The court has explained that in cases 
concerning family reunification, it pays particular attention to the circumstances of the 
children concerned, especially their age, their situation in the country or countries concerned, 
and the extent to which they are dependent on their parents.47 Best interests have been 
decisive in some cases, but the impact on children of decisions concerning parents is often 
under-rated or little discussed.48 As Ciara Smyth has noted, considering a diversity of factors 
is appropriate: the Committee on the Rights of the Child has itself drafted a list of elements to 
be taken into account when assessing best interests. What the ECtHR infers from different 
factors, however, varies significantly.49 
Immigration cases can be divided into first-entry cases, where the applicant has never been 
admitted to the state, and expulsion cases, where the applicant has a right to reside but faces a 
threat of deportation. First-entry cases can be further divided into cases concerning literal 
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No 67/04) [2010] 2 FLR 912, [107]–[119]. 
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46 See, for example, Tanda-Muzinga v France (Application No 2260/10) 10 July 2014, [65]. 
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(Application No 31753/02) 28 June 2007. In Kaya, the applicant’s child was deliberately ignored since the child 
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49 Smyth, above n 21, 85; CRC/C/GC/14, [52]–[79]. 
first-entry and those in which the persons concerned have already resided in the host state 
without a valid residence permit. First-entry and expulsion cases have different implications 
for the right to respect for family life. In first-entry cases, the emphasis is on positive 
obligations, allowing the establishment of family life. In expulsion cases, negative 
obligations, not interfering with family life, are accentuated. Although the distinction 
between positive and negative obligations is not always clear,50 the ECtHR applies somewhat 
different tests in expulsion and first-entry cases.  
In Üner, the court complemented a previous list of criteria for assessing whether deportation 
of a non-national parent breaches Article 8 with ‘the best interests and well-being of the 
children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant 
are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled’.51 The Üner 
judgment demonstrates problems related to the criteria because the court disagreed on their 
interpretation.52 Another set of criteria used in expulsion cases applies to young adults with 
no family of their own. These ‘Maslov criteria’ include the nature and seriousness of the 
offence, length of stay in the country, time elapsed after the offence and conduct since, 
solidity of social, cultural, and family ties with the host country and with the country of 
destination, and duration of the exclusion order. The obligation to have regard to best 
interests applies both if the person to be expelled is a minor and if the person is no longer a 
minor but the reason for the expulsion lies in offences committed while a minor. There is 
‘little room for justifying an expulsion of a settled migrant on account of mostly non-violent 
offences committed when a minor’.53 
In first-entry cases, the court usually applies the obstacles test or the exceptional 
circumstances test and sometimes the reasonableness test. In the obstacles test, the state is 
regarded as exceeding its margin only if there are ‘insurmountable obstacles’ to establishing 
family life in the country of origin or elsewhere. The obstacles test does not apply to the 
family reunification of refugees because they cannot lead family life ‘elsewhere’. In such 
cases, the court has underlined that applications for family reunification need to be examined 
with flexibility and humanity.54 In the exceptional circumstances test, the court assesses 
whether exceptional circumstances exist that would lead to a violation in the case of 
expulsion. The reasonableness test, which focuses on whether family reunification is the most 
adequate means of developing family life, may be more favourable for the applicant.55 
In immigration cases, the court assesses seriously the child’s ties with the respondent state 
and the country of deportation or origin. Nationality has some significance in the assessment 
of ties. In Kamenov, a deportation case, the court considered 12- and 14-year-old daughters 
who were Russian nationals, had never lived in Kazakhstan, and had no ties to the country. 
Although it concluded that their ‘resettlement would mean a radical upheaval’, best interests 
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52 Üner, ibid, joint dissenting opinion of Judges Costa, Zupančič and Türmen. 
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ties in Tanda-Muzinga and the ages of the children in Mugenzi. 
55 Smyth, above n 21, 93–94. 
were not decisive in finding a violation.56 A violation was also found in a case where the 
Nigerian father of twin daughters, who had Swiss and Nigerian nationality, faced expulsion. 
The court held that it was in the daughters’ best interests to grow up with both parents and 
that the children and the Swiss mother, who was no longer in a relationship with the father, 
‘could hardly be obliged’ to settle in Nigeria.57 On the other hand, a one-year-old Swiss 
national was considered able to integrate because of his young age when his mother was 
expelled.58 The court has sometimes argued that possessing the nationality of the respondent 
state allows the children to return regularly if their parent is deported.59 The court has also 
recognised that children were nationals of the country of expulsion and that it did not ‘appear 
arbitrary to accept’ that the presence of the parents, as well as other relatives, would alleviate 
their integration difficulties.60 
Integration in the host state has led to judgments in the applicant’s favour, especially 
concerning juvenile offenders. In Maslov, the Grand Chamber held that very serious reasons 
are required to justify the expulsion of aliens who have lawfully spent most of their 
childhoods in the host country. The court noted that the obligation to consider the best 
interests of the child includes an obligation to facilitate reintegration, an aim that should be 
pursued by the juvenile justice system, according to Article 40 CRC. That aim ‘will not be 
achieved by severing family or social ties through expulsion, which must remain a means of 
last resort’.61 It is notable that the ECtHR connected best interests to the relevant CRC right 
in Maslov. 
In first-entry cases, integration is assessed more strictly. In Berisha, the applicants’ children 
had entered the respondent state clandestinely to live with their parents, who then applied for 
family reunification. At the time of the judgment, the children had been living in Switzerland 
for four years and were 10, 17, and 19 years old. The court considered that while they were 
well integrated, the stay was not long enough, and solid social and linguistic ties to the home 
country must still exist. In addition, their grandmother, who had looked after them for over 
two years, was still living in Kosovo, demonstrating the strength of family ties.62  
The discrepancies in how family unity is assessed  
Different default position 
The ECtHR’s starting point in child protection cases is that it is in the best interests of the 
child to grow up in her original family, which is why the threshold for taking a child into care 
is high. This starting point originates from the right to respect for family life and follows the 
logic of Article 9 CRC, which outlines that States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be 
separated from his or her parents against their will, except when necessary for the best 
interests of the child. 
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On the other hand, the ECtHR is reluctant to find a violation because of the care order itself. 
Once national authorities have considered it necessary to take a child into care, or to prolong 
the care or impose contact restrictions,63 the court usually trusts that assessment because of 
subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation. Authorities, however, carry the burden of proof, 
having to demonstrate that they have proved the family unfit, acted diligently, and made 
sufficient efforts to preserve ties.64  
According to the ECtHR, two factors must be considered in identifying the child’s best 
interests in child protection cases. Firstly, the child’s ties with her family should be 
maintained except when the family has proved particularly unfit. Secondly, the child should 
develop in a safe and secure environment.65 Severing all ties between the parent and child 
cuts the child from her roots and can only be justified in exceptional circumstances or by the 
‘overriding requirement’ of the child’s best interests.66 Best interests have a ‘double role’,67 
or are ‘seen to comprise two limbs’.68 Best interests are usually realised as protected by 
Article 8 when the child lives with her parents. However, they also justify interfering with 
family life because under no circumstances is a parent entitled to harm the child’s health and 
development.69  
In child protection cases, the ECtHR has often approached best interests through negation, by 
listing circumstances that cannot be considered as in the best interests of the child. These 
include physical abuse, sexual abuse, shortcomings in care or state of health, and parents’ 
mental instability, among other things. Without allegations regarding the parents’ ability to 
care for the children, economic reasons were considered an insufficient justification for a care 
order.70 Similarly, without allegations of abuse, a care order because of circumstances at 
home and alleged neglect was not considered necessary.71 When a care order had been issued 
because the applicant father allegedly had alcohol problems, was largely dependent on social 
benefits, and the home had no electricity, the court found the reasons for removal relevant but 
not sufficient; here, too, no allegations of abuse had been made.72 Conversely, in a case 
where national authorities had good reason to be concerned and home conditions were not the 
sole reason for placement, a temporary placement of the applicants’ seven children was 
considered in their best interests and in accordance with Article 8.73 In another case, the 
parents’ limited intellectual capacities were not an acceptable justification for public care in 
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the absence of sufficient consideration of alternative measures.74  
Approaching best interests through negation has advantages from the original family’s 
perspective. When assessing whether something is against the best interests of the child, the 
ECtHR may treat the family more fairly. According to the ECtHR, the fact that a child could 
be placed in a more beneficial environment will not alone justify a removal from biological 
parents; other circumstances must exist pointing to the necessity of the measure.75 Unless 
child protection authorities are responding to an immediate risk, removal has not been found 
to be justified before other, less restrictive, measures have been taken. Authorities must 
demonstrate that they have considered less restrictive alternatives and fulfilled their positive 
obligations by supporting families. The court has taken the strictest stance towards 
emergency care orders carried out without the parents’ involvement.76 
Family unity is not similarly privileged in immigration cases, other than those concerning 
refugees. For refugees, the court has noted that family unity is an essential right and family 
reunification is fundamental to allowing persons fleeing from persecution to lead a normal 
life.77 In other immigration cases, the ECtHR does not assume that living with the parents is 
in the best interests of the child. Instead, the court usually questions the ties between the 
parent and the child and assesses separately whether cohabitation with the parent is in the 
child’s best interests at all. The court has, for example, held that ‘it does not emerge that the 
third applicant [child] had any special care needs or that her mother would be unable to 
provide satisfactory care on her own’.78 Similarly, it decided that there was ‘no presumption’ 
that reuniting the applicant child with the applicant father was ‘per se’ in his best interests.79 
While exceptions to this rule exist,80 usually the nature of the relationship is an important 
factor when assessing whether refusal of entry or expulsion would be against the best 
interests of the child. If ties are assessed to be close, contact with both parents is favoured, 
which follows the logic of Article 9 CRC. Article 9 CRC, however, prohibits separation from 
both parents. Separation from one parent, if not required for the best interests of the child, 
breaches Article 9 CRC.  
The expression ‘exceptional circumstances’ illustrates how differently the court assesses 
family unity in immigration cases. In child protection cases, family ties can be severed only 
in exceptional circumstances. In immigration cases, only in exceptional circumstances can a 
violation be found. In this respect, immigration case law can be criticised for inconsistency, 
since certain circumstances have been considered exceptional in some cases, such as 
Jeunesse and Kaplan, but not in others, such as Antwi. Antwi was an expulsion case where the 
deportee was a father with no criminal past other than violations of immigration rules – he 
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had been granted a residence permit on the basis of a false identity. The court acknowledged 
that the father had an important role in the daily care and upbringing of his ten-year-old 
daughter, a Norwegian national. However, it held that no insurmountable obstacles prevented 
the applicants from settling in Ghana and the child had no special care needs. According to 
the court, no exceptional circumstances were present, and sufficient weight had been attached 
to the child’s best interests in ordering the expulsion.81 
The Grand Chamber case of Jeunesse concerned the refusal of a residence permit to a mother 
who had three children, all Dutch nationals, and had stayed in the Netherlands for a long time 
without a valid residence permit. She explicitly relied on the fact that the national decision 
was not in accordance with Article 3 CRC. The circumstances were exceptional because of 
the best interests of the children; the court considered it obvious that their interests would be 
best served if they continued to live with their mother, since she was the primary carer. While 
the national authorities had had ‘some regard’ for the children, the court was not convinced 
that ‘actual evidence on such matters was considered and assessed’. There were additional 
factors in the applicant’s favour, but best interests were decisive in finding a violation.82 Best 
interests were also decisive in Kaplan, a similar case to Antwi, except that the reason for 
expulsion was criminal convictions and the youngest of the applicant father’s three children 
was autistic. The court was not ‘convinced in the concrete and exceptional circumstances of 
the case that sufficient weight was attached to the best interests of the child’.83 
Jeunesse and Kaplan were concluded after Antwi. Later cases are divided as to whether best 
interests are accorded a more significant role. Kaplan has been referred to in one other case, 
which led to a finding of a violation.84 Jeunesse has been referred to to emphasise national 
decision-making bodies’ duty to ‘advert to and assess evidence in respect of the practicality, 
feasibility and proportionality of any removal of a non-national parent in order to give 
effective protection and sufficient weight to the best interests of the children directly affected 
by it’.85 In some cases, the court has recognised the importance of best interests but 
concluded that ‘in the context of the removal of a non-national parent as a consequence of a 
criminal conviction, the decision first and foremost concerns the offender’ and that the nature 
and seriousness of the offence or offending history may outweigh other criteria,86 even that ‘a 
State is entitled, as a matter of international law and subject to its treaty obligations, to 
control the entry of aliens into its territory and their residence there’.87 This argumentation 
formally acknowledges the importance of best interests, but the real purpose of referring to 
Jeunesse seems to be to emphasise the case as an exception, not a new rule.88 
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Preserving ties: privileged or not  
One key aspect of family unity, that of preserving ties between family members, is reflected 
in the child protection jurisprudence. Case law relating to contact restrictions demonstrates 
that if a child cannot live with her family, being in contact with parents and siblings and 
preserving family ties to the extent possible is generally in her best interests. The margin for 
imposing further limitations for a child taken into care is narrower than the margin for taking 
a child into care.89 Nevertheless, even severe contact restrictions or placement in an external 
foster home, rather than with relatives, may be in the child’s best interests, in providing a 
stable and secure environment.90 Even an emergency care order, foster care, and the 
subsequent severing of legal ties leading to adoption do not necessarily violate Article 8.91 
The court’s attitude towards ending public care highlights the importance it places on 
preserving ties. In principle, a care order should be regarded as a temporary measure and 
implemented with the ultimate aim of reuniting the parent and child.92 National authorities 
have a duty to reassess the situation regularly, and this duty weighs with progressively 
increasing force from the commencement of the period of care, ‘subject always to its being 
balanced against the duty to consider the best interests of the child’. Furthermore, ‘[a]fter a 
considerable period of time has passed since the child was originally taken into public care, 
the interest of a child not to have his or her de facto family situation changed again may 
override the interests of the parents to have their family reunited’.93 When the court has been 
persuaded that national authorities will continue to support the relations between the parents 
and children, it is less likely that a violation will be found.94 If the biological family does not 
visit a child who has been taken into care, it may be argued that not returning to them is in the 
child’s best interests.95 
The court has been strictest when the child–parent connection, or connection between 
siblings, has been completely severed. In EP, a mother complained about the adoption of her 
daughter following a period in foster care. The court noted that even though the mother 
demonstrated obsessive medical care towards her daughter and acted impulsively, the contact 
ban should not have been total and meetings should have been arranged.96 In SH, the 
applicant’s children had been taken into care and then declared available for adoption after 
incidents of ingesting medication. Experts had been in favour of preserving family ties, and 
the parents claimed to be capable of caring for the children with assistance. The court found 
that safeguarding both the child’s best interests and ties with the mother would have been 
possible. Furthermore, the three children had been placed in different families, leading to the 
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severing of sibling ties. The court seems to have searched for the best solution for the 
children; adoption was in their interests, but living in the biological family was a better 
alternative. The key reason for finding a violation was the national authorities’ failure to 
explore other options.97  
In immigration cases, the applicant is often expected to prove that ties are strong or that best 
interests should weigh in the assessment.98 In AH Khan, the applicant had not seen his six 
children for 11 years because of his imprisonment. The court held that, given the time that 
had passed and the lack of evidence of a ‘positive relationship’ between them, the applicant 
had not ‘established that his children’s best interests were adversely affected by his 
deportation’.99 The judgment seems reasonable but it also raises questions as to how an 
imprisoned parent can prove the existence of ties without a possibility to meet the children.100 
In MPEV, the applicant father was able to prove his central role in the family; he had raised 
his daughter with his ex-spouse and had extensive contact rights. Best interests seem to have 
been decisive in finding a violation, though the moderate nature of the crimes and the child’s 
integration pointed towards the same outcome.101 The burden also falls on the applicant to 
prove that contact cannot be maintained over the phone or internet. The court has on several 
occasions considered that deportation does not rupture the parent–child relationship because 
the children can remain in the respondent state and maintain contact through visits and 
telecommunication.102 
The court’s assessment of whether separation is against the child’s best interests is also 
affected by whether the parent and child have been living together before the expulsion. If a 
separation has occurred because of imprisonment or other reasons, the court is more likely to 
conclude that separation is not against best interests and that physical contact is not needed in 
the future.103 A brief period of living together has not changed the assessment.104 In ME, the 
court took into account the applicant father’s two children but added that it ‘cannot overlook’ 
his very limited contact with them.105 A different approach was taken in Osman concerning a 
refusal to reinstate the applicant’s residence permit; the applicant, a minor at the time of the 
events, had not seen her mother for four years. However, the court held that this could be 
explained by ‘practical and economical restraints, and can hardly lead to the conclusion that 
the applicant and her mother did not wish to maintain or intensify their family life 
together’.106 
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In cases of parental separation where the parent susceptible to expulsion or seeking 
regularisation does not have care of the child but a contact arrangement exists, the court is 
more likely to conclude that exclusion is against the child’s best interests. Because the 
children will remain in the host state, the court cannot consider whether their best interests 
would involve moving elsewhere.107 However, best interests can be outweighed by factors 
related to crime.108 In Udeh, the applicant father had spent long periods in prison and had 
very limited contact rights. Parental divorce contributed to deciding the case in the 
applicant’s favour, the court finding that growing up with both parents was in the daughters’ 
best interests and the only way to maintain regular contact between the father and daughters 
was to allow him to remain.109 In Da Silva v Netherlands, the court assessed whether a 
Surinamese mother who had resided illegally in the Netherlands should be allowed to 
continue residing there with her Dutch daughter. Parental authority had been awarded to the 
Dutch father, and refusing to allow the mother to stay would separate her from the daughter. 
In the custody proceedings, the national courts – following the advice of the child welfare 
authorities – assessed that it was in the three-year-old daughter’s best interests to stay, which 
seems to have been decisive in finding a violation, combined with evidence that the mother 
was the primary carer.110 In Nunez, the best interests of the applicant’s daughters, aged eight 
and nine, were also decisive when the mother faced expulsion. The mother’s interests were 
not sufficient to constitute a breach of Article 8; she had violated immigration rules and had 
never had a legitimate basis to reside. Yet ‘particular regard to the children’s best interest’ 
changed the situation. As the daughters’ father had custody, they would remain in Norway, 
but they had been living for a long period with the applicant. The children had experienced 
stress because of the situation, and even after the two-year entry ban, it was uncertain 
whether they would see the mother. A two-year separation was ‘a very long period for 
children of the ages in question’. Hence, the court was not convinced that, in the ‘concrete 
and exceptional circumstances of the case’, sufficient weight had been attached to best 
interests.111 
A pattern becomes apparent when contrasted with cases where parents are together. In 
Kissiwa Koffi, the court held that the applicant mother’s Swiss husband could join his 
expelled wife in Ivory Coast, also his country of origin, even though he had two other 
children in Switzerland, where he had resided for about 20 years. The court considered it 
significant that the mother had left behind another child in Ivory Coast.112 In Antwi, where the 
deportee was male, the court held that since both parents were raised in Ghana, there were 
‘no insurmountable obstacles in the way of the applicants settling together in Ghana or, at the 
least, to maintaining regular contacts’. The mother was a Norwegian citizen, employed in 
Norway, but the court still considered that no particular obstacles prevented her from 
                                                 
107 Smyth, above n 21, 98–99; M Leloup, ‘The principle of the best interests of the child in the expulsion case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights: Procedural rationality as a remedy for inconsistency’ (2019) 37 
NQHR 50, 59 
108 Chair and JB v Germany (Application No 69735/01) 6 December 2007, [66]–[67]. 
109 Udeh v Switzerland, above n 57, [52]. 
110 Da Silva v Netherlands, above n 24, [40]–[44]. 
111 Nunez v Norway (Application No 55597/09) (2014) 58 EHRR 17, [71]–[84]. 
112 Kissiwa Koffi v Switzerland, above n 58, [67]–[69]. Blaming mothers has been criticised, see Smyth, above 
n 21, 83–84; F Staiano, ‘Good Mothers, Bad Mothers: Transnational Mothering in the European Court of 
Human Rights’ Case Law’ [2013] EJML 155. 
accompanying her deported husband.113 Although no definitive conclusions can be made 
based on a small number of cases, the emphasis on origin in Kissiwa Koffi and Antwi raises 
concerns about discrimination.114 
Moreover, cases like Rodrigues da Silva and Nunez call into question whether the court 
values the child’s connection with the mother more than with the father. The court seems to 
require fathers to prove more fully their involvement in family life and more readily accepts 
that fathers can maintain contact via technology. In addition, the parents’ relationship status 
has a significant role in immigration cases but not in child protection cases. From the 
perspective of child, this appears arbitrary. 
Young age: care needs or adaptability 
The child’s age is relevant in both child protection and immigration cases. In child protection 
cases, the court has paid attention to the importance of protecting family unity, especially 
where young children are concerned. The court recently referred to the General Comment on 
young children, indicating that early childhood is a critical period for the realisation of rights 
safeguarded by the CRC and that ‘young children are reliant on responsible authorities to 
assess and represent their rights and best interests in relation to decisions and actions that 
affect their well-being, while taking account of their views and evolving capacities’.115 
In child protection cases, the court has also recognised that time is crucial as a prolonged 
rupture of contact can have irreparable consequences on relations between a parent and very 
young child.116 Regarding a child taken into care as a three-year-old, the court noted that ‘the 
breaking-off of contact with a very young child may result in the progressive deterioration of 
the child’s relationship with his or her parent’.117 If considerable time has passed since the 
child was taken into public care, protection of the new family life may take priority in the 
best interests’ assessment.118 
In immigration cases, the court often equates young age with ‘adaptability’, which has 
frequently been a decisive argument for expulsion. An adaptable child is considered able to 
adjust to a new environment, even with non-existent ties to that country.119 Adaptability does 
not have a definition or benchmark age, but the court seems to consider that the younger the 
child, the more adaptable.120 It is unclear whether adaptability is calculated from the initiation 
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This can lead to discriminatory outcomes, especially concerning older children who may 
reach the age of majority during the proceedings.121 
Adaptability often trumps cultural and linguistic ties and, sometimes, nationality. Carmen 
Draghici shows that some cases imply that the citizen of a contracting state to the European 
Convention has no presumptive right to enjoy family life with a child who does not possess 
the same nationality.122 Children aged six and one-and-a-half when the exclusion order was 
finalised were considered adaptable even though they were Dutch nationals and had always 
lived in the country.123 A six-year-old Swiss national was considered able to adapt to the 
Ivory Coast, to where her mother was expelled.124 Expulsion of a father of children aged 
eight and five,125 as well as a father of children attending primary school and kindergarten,126 
was considered acceptable because of the children’s presumed adaptability. Expulsion of a 
nine-year-old’s father eventually breached Article 8 because of other factors, but the girl was 
initially found adaptable.127 Adaptability has often outweighed the potential difficulties of 
moving to another country.128 In SJ, the court noted on a general level that ‘[w]here there are 
children, the crucial question is whether they are of an age at which they can adjust to a 
different environment’. In that case, the ECtHR held that a mother of children aged six, four, 
and one could be expelled because the children’s ages made their adaptability ‘still 
sufficiently great’ to make the resettlement realistic. The applicant, who had HIV, argued that 
the care she needed was not available in Nigeria. No violation was found even though the 
children were born in Belgium and had strong ties there. Surprisingly, the court’s reasoning 
was partly based on family unity, as it found decisive that the expulsion would not separate 
the applicant and her children.129  
Regarding immigration cases where parents have separated, Smyth has noted that the child’s 
young age aids the parent’s claim since the court considers it important for young children to 
maintain regular contact with both parents.130 Conversely, a 15-year-old has been regarded 
‘not as much in need of care as young children’.131 This line of reasoning contrasts with cases 
where parents are together. In Berisha, the parents had the right to reside in Switzerland and 
the issue was whether their children, who had resided there irregularly, should be allowed to 
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join them. The court acknowledged the paramount status of best interests and broadly 
referred to the CRC but found no violation. The court held that the applicants were not 
prevented from travelling to Kosovo to ensure that the youngest child, a ten-year-old, was 
provided with adequate care and education, so her best interests were safeguarded.132 The 
dissenters noted that such a young child was heavily dependent on her parents, and her return 
to Kosovo would cause significant uprooting and difficulties.133 In Berisha and other cases in 
which the children or parents have initially entered the country unlawfully, the court’s 
approach may be explained partly by an unwillingness to condemn national authorities for 
deterring illegal conduct. From a children’s rights’ perspective, however, children should not 
be blamed for their parents’ actions. Adaptability is relied on in expulsion cases, too, as 
shown earlier. 
Assessing adaptability based on a child’s age does not accommodate the child’s individual 
situation. The assessment of adaptability in immigration cases should as a minimum be 
combined with an assessment of the special care needs of young children and of relevant 
rights, such as the right to education, because the children concerned often attend school in 
the host country.134 In Zakayev and Safanova, the children’s vulnerability was recognised. A 
factor in the applicant couple’s favour was that they and their children had already twice been 
subjected to the stress of forced migration. This was demonstrated by the children’s fragile 
health and their integration in their current environment. The court accepted that moving to 
an unfamiliar place would be contrary to the children’s interests and lead to a deterioration of 
their well-being.135 Interestingly, the court has been more understanding of difficulties faced 
by migrants in child protection cases than in immigration cases that do not involve child 
protection. In EP, the court held that adoption following the taking into care of the child was 
‘so severe a measure against a mother who had just arrived in Italy with her little daughter 
who spoke only Greek, and about whose past the authorities dealing with the case knew very 
little’.136 In KAB, the court criticised the failure to recognise that a Nigerian national whose 
expulsion was ordered had a one-year-old child who had subsequently been taken into care 
and declared available for adoption. The court considered the situation especially serious 
because of the child’s age.137 
Obtaining children’s views and giving them due weight 
Another difference between child protection and immigration cases is the importance of 
children’s views. Following Article 12 CRC, a child who is capable of forming his or her 
own views has the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting him or her, the 
views being given due weight in accordance with his or her age and maturity. In some child 
protection cases, the child’s opinion (or lack of availability) has been decisive, which is 
promising for the alignment of the European Convention and the CRC. The Committee on 
the Rights of the Child has underlined the interdependent nature of best interests and 
participation; an outcome cannot be in the child’s best interests if the child has not had an 
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opportunity to express her views.138 The children concerned are sometimes too young to be 
heard, but acknowledging the importance of their views is nonetheless essential.139 
The ECtHR has, for example, stressed the fact that a child, aged 14 when the ECtHR gave its 
judgment, had ‘always firmly indicated’ her wish not to leave her foster home.140 In Aune, the 
court mentioned the child’s wishes, as heard by national courts, as an important factor.141 In 
Gnahoré, the fact that authorities had sought the child’s views was a factor in proving that 
neither renewing the care order nor contact restrictions breached Article 8.142 In L, the denial 
of a grandfather’s contact was acceptable partly because the two children had indicated their 
wish not to meet the grandfather, who was suspected of sexual abuse.143 In Nanning, the court 
found a non-violation regarding a continued placement in a foster family largely based on an 
expert assessment that the child’s ‘firm wish to remain with the foster family’ should be 
respected. The court observed that the child had not been heard in person but still considered 
the assessment valid.144 In assessing contact restrictions, the court has acknowledged the 
views of children who did not want to meet the applicant mother more than twice a year, as 
well as the fact that the children reacted negatively to the meetings.145 
The effect of external circumstances on the child’s opinion has been recognised in some 
cases. In assessing contact restrictions in Glesmann, the court found a non-violation largely 
because the child, then aged 12, had consistently declared her wish not to have contact with 
the applicant and only gave up her resistance to end the court proceedings.146 The minority in 
Gnahoré held that even if the boy’s opinion was an important factor, it was not sufficient 
justification for the prohibition of contact because the opinion was understandably affected 
by the fact that he was physically distant from his original family.147 
In child protection cases, the court has also criticised national authorities for not hearing the 
children. In Saviny, where the children had been removed from the home because of 
inadequate living conditions and shortcomings in care, the court noted that at no stage had the 
children been heard, although the eldest was 13.148 In NTS, three brothers had been returned 
to their biological father, who had drug problems, after being placed with their aunt for years. 
The court found that the ‘two fundamental aspects’ of the case were whether the children had 
been duly involved in the proceedings and whether the decisions were ‘dictated’ by their best 
interests. Domestic courts had not heard the children, considered the possibility of hearing at 
least the eldest boy, or given reasons for not hearing him. The children’s judicial 
representation had, therefore, been insufficient. The court extensively quoted the General 
Comments on best interests and on the right to be heard, implying the relationship between 
them. Domestic courts had ‘failed to give adequate consideration to one important fact: the 
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boys did not want to be reunited with their father’. An expert opinion, which indicated that 
forced return would be contrary to the boys’ best interests, seems to have been relevant in the 
assessment. Best interests consideration had been ‘inadequate and one-sided’, and the boys’ 
‘emotional state of mind was simply ignored’.149 
In immigration cases, the court has rarely paid attention to the children’s views. Even in cases 
where the court conducts a separate best interests assessment, the child’s opinion usually is 
not considered regardless of whether the applicant has argued that the child(ren) involved 
should be heard or whether the child is also an applicant. In Palanci, the applicant father, 
who faced deportation, alleged that the authorities had never conducted a hearing with his 
family and consequently had not sufficiently taken his children’s best interests into account. 
This aspect was not addressed by the court.150 In Kissiwa Koffi, the son’s status as the second 
applicant was mostly ignored, which is reflected in the language: ‘as to the common child . . . 
the court cannot speculate on the decision of the parents concerning his fate’.151 
On the other hand, in Osman, it was decisive that the national authorities had ignored the 
opinion of the applicant, a minor at the time of the events, whose residence permit had not 
been reinstated. The court noted that the applicant’s view – that her father’s decision to send 
her to Kenya for a long time had been against her will and not in her best interests – had been 
disregarded by the authorities. The court held that even though the care and upbringing of 
children normally require parents to decide where the child resides, authorities cannot ignore 
the child’s interest, including Article 8 rights.152 
As Smyth has noted, the ECtHR cannot shoulder all the blame for the rare appearances of 
children’s views in immigration cases since frequently the children involved are not party to 
the proceedings at the national level.153 The scarce attention to children’s views in 
immigration cases may be partly explained by the differences in national procedures in child 
protection cases as opposed to immigration cases. In the former, child welfare authorities 
often conduct a hearing with the child. On the other hand, children are applicants more often 
in immigration cases before the ECtHR. Moreover, the uneven role assigned to the child’s 
views may partly relate to the aspects on which those views are gauged. One might easily 
argue that the child should not be reunited with a potentially harmful parent if the child 
opposes it, but claiming that domestic authorities should regularly respect the child’s choice 
of country of residence is more difficult. Here, again, the different role of best interests in 
child protection and immigration cases is obvious. 
However, it is important to underline that hearing children is a procedural guarantee. 
According to Article 12 CRC, children have the right to express their views in all matters 
affecting them, regardless of the outcome. Child protection cases clearly affect children but 
so do decisions about family reunification and the child or parent’s expulsion. The ECtHR 
itself has affirmed that in light of Article 12 CRC, ‘it cannot be said that the children capable 
of forming their own views were sufficiently involved in the decision-making process if they 
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were not provided with the opportunity to be heard and thus express their views’.154 In 
assessing an issue with long-lasting consequences, the children concerned should have the 
opportunity to express their views, irrespective of the context. 
Conclusions 
Several patterns emerge in the different ways that the ECtHR treats the best interests of the 
child in child protection and immigration cases. In child protection cases, the best interests of 
the child are the focus of the assessment and are often decisive. Some differences are 
explained by the different nature of the two case groups and some differences are common 
sense, such as the emphasis on physical integrity in child protection cases and on ties with the 
country of origin or respondent state in immigration cases; but some differences appear 
unjustified in light of Article 3 CRC. 
The most notable difference relates to a child’s right not to be separated from her parents. In 
child protection cases, the court assumes that it is in the child’s best interests to live with her 
parents. Taking a child into care can only be justified if required because of best interests. If 
the child has been taken into care, contact with her parents is considered to be in her best 
interests, in conformity with Article 9 CRC. In immigration cases, however, the court does 
not assume that best interests require living with both parents, but assesses this as a separate 
question. Furthermore, the burden of proof operates differently in child protection and 
immigration cases. In child protection cases, the state has to prove that the limitations to the 
right to family life are necessary. In immigration cases, the applicant – especially the 
applicant father – often has to demonstrate a significant role in the family or close 
relationship with the child.155 Refugees, however, receive more favourable treatment. 
A second difference is the significance of the child’s age. In child protection cases, the 
ECtHR has considered the care needs of young children. In immigration cases, young age 
demonstrates ‘adaptability’; ‘adaptable’ children are considered able to integrate into another 
country, often even if they are nationals of the respondent state. A third difference is that 
children’s views have been important in several child protection cases but rarely in 
immigration cases. 
Considering these disparities, the court should take family unity as its starting point in 
immigration cases, as it does in child protection cases. This does not mean that close ties 
should not serve as an argument against deportation or for family reunification, or that 
exclusion would never be permissible.156 Rather, family unity should be the default position 
in all case groups, and the court should require the state to justify the deportation or refusal of 
entry.157  
The following improvements can be enacted to make argumentation in immigration cases 
more child-friendly. All aspects listed in Article 9 CRC, including separation, the procedural 
limb, and maintaining contact, are separately assessed by the ECtHR in child protection cases 
but not in immigration cases. Applying the structure of Article 9 CRC to immigration cases 
as well, would better serve children regardless of nationality and immigration status.158 
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Underlining the procedural side of Article 8, identified in child protection cases, would be 
particularly beneficial. Some indications of the procedural side in other case groups can be 
found; in M and M, for example, the court stated that the procedural requirements identified 
in a number of child-care cases ‘apply mutatis mutandis in any judicial or administrative 
proceedings affecting children’s rights under Article 8 of the present Convention’.159 
Another way to align argumentation is to refer deliberately in immigration cases to judgments 
from other case groups. The ECtHR often refers to other cases when discussing the weight of 
best interests on a general level in immigration cases, but references are rarer when the facts 
of the case are examined. In addition, the court could more actively oversee that national 
authorities do not conflate the assessment and weight of best interests; separating the two is 
possible even when no violation is found.160 Applying a more nuanced adaptability 
assessment is also recommended to better account for each child’s individual situation; there 
are some promising examples where the court has been sensitive to circumstances 
contributing to children’s vulnerability. Furthermore, a more applicant-friendly burden of 
proof could be applied in immigration cases, and Üner criteria and other checklists should be 
applied transparently.161 Finally, in accordance with Article 12 CRC, the court could oversee 
whether national authorities have respected the child’s right to be heard.  
Reconceptualising public interest in immigration cases is also essential. In immigration cases, 
public interest is equated with the state’s interest in immigration control and presented as a 
counter-argument to the rights of individuals.162 This juxtaposition is not self-evident; it 
could be argued that preserving family life is the state’s interest, too.163 In the context of 
adoption and the child’s right to know her origins, the court has declared the child’s best 
interests primary to public interest.164 At a minimum, the state should be required to examine 
public interest further and not take it for granted.165 As Judge Turković has summarised: 
‘it is of utmost importance to balance wisely society’s impulse to attach greater 
weight to the public interest than to private and family life claims under Article 8 
of the Convention. After all, it is impossible to make a sharp distinction between 
the two. It is in the public interest to protect the private- and family-life claims of 
long-term migrants.’166  
This article has identified problems in the court’s use of the best interests concept, especially 
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in immigration cases. An approach focusing on the limitations of legitimate expectations for 
adults, such as whether the immigration status was precarious when the family was formed, 
risks overlooking the interests of children.167 From the perspective of children’s rights, it is 
problematic that parents’ choices and immigration status often determine the extent to which 
their children can effectively exercise their human rights. The European Convention system 
has the potential to protect children’s rights in the immigration context, too, but so far that 
potential has not been fully realised. 
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